Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...) compare and contrast them. In particular, we want to examine how they handle the reason-giving power of affective states. We will look into two representationalist proposals (Evaluativism and Imperativism) and a functionalist proposal, and argue that, contrary to their own advertisements, the representationalist proposals don’t have good accounts of why and how sensory affect can motivate, rationalize, and justify subsequent behavior and intentional mental activity. We will show that our own functionalist proposal does a much better job in this regard, and that when the representationalist proposals are modified to do a better job, they fare better not because of their representationalist credentials but due to their functionalist ones. (shrink)

This work is best described as an endeavour to contribute to the phenomenology of intentions, the experiences of intending to do something. It finds its point of departure in the discussion of two ‘analytic philosophers’, John Searle and John McDowell, where two contrasting accounts of intentions are offered. The first task is to derive a hybrid account, according to which there are different kinds of intentions, each having the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. The (...) remainder of the discussion is a phenomenological justification of the hybrid account. Through a critical engagement with work of the classical phenomenologists, descriptions are advanced towards the end of demonstrating that the genus intention splits into the species projecting and willing and that each instantiates the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. This work does not offer a complete justification of the hybrid account; rather, the discussion culminates with the articulation of a concrete phenomenological problem, the answer to which is a condition for the evaluation of the phenomenological merit of the hybrid account. This problem functions as an invitation for other phenomenologists to return to thing themselves and engage in concrete phenomenological work. (shrink)

"Ruh Üzerine Yazılar" içinde, Berk Özcangiller (ed.), Alfa Yayınları, 2021.

Turkey; politics and government; foreign economic relations; globalization.

Parmenides plays an important role in the first section of Hegel’s Science of Logic due to his definition of being as a pure thought-determination. This article investigates, first, how Hegel conceives the Parmenidean being. Secondly, by discussing Hegel's logical analysis of pure being and pure nothing, it aims to show why and how such conception of being, according to Hegel, provides a crucial insight into the function of the understanding.

The current debate that surrounds the issue of patient rights and the transformation of health care, social insurance, and reimbursement systems has put the topic of patient responsibility on both the public and health care sectors' agenda. This climate of debate and transition provides an ideal time to rethink patient responsibilities, together with their underlying rationale, and to determine if they are properly represented when being called `patient' responsibilities. In this article we analyze the various types of patient responsibilities, identify (...) the underlying motivations behind their creation, and conclude upon their sensibleness and merit. The range of patient responsibilities that have been proposed and implemented can be reclassified and placed into one of four groups, which are more accurate descriptors of the nature of these responsibilities. We suggest that, within the framework of a free-market system, where health care services are provided based on the ability to pay for them, none of these can properly be justified as a patient responsibility. (shrink)

This is a partial phenomenological study of a phenomenon that I call “displaced feeling”, which is best illustrated through a concrete example. I am overcome by a strong desire to stop writing. For one reason or another, I reject the possibility of pursuing this desire. Instead of giving up the desire altogether, however, I may “speak to myself” as follows: “I feel like having a coffee” and, the chatter goes on in the background “of course to make coffee means to (...) stop writing”. I endorse the desire to get a cup of coffee. But the action through which I pursue this desire is coloured not by the feeling that anticipates the value associated with drinking coffee but by a feeling that anticipates the value associated with stopping writing. The latter feeling has displaced the former: I am in a state of displaced feeling. Here, I will elucidate two invariant structures of displaced feeling. First, I will show that displaced feeling involves the realisation of an endorsed state of affairs, the bringing about of a rejected state of affairs, and the belief that the former will determine the latter. Next, I will show that the endorsed state of affairs appears prominently as the end of an intention, that the rejected state of affairs appears inconspicuously in the horizon of the same intention, and that the belief appears twice: as a motive for this intention and as the “glue” that keeps its prominent and inconspicuous zones together. (shrink)

This article analyses the relationship between deduction and induction by focusing on Aristotle's knowledge acquisition processes. The deductive and inductive processes in Aristotelian science are analysed in depth, and it is emphasised that these two processes are, in fact, interrelated. It is claimed that induction and deduction use logical inference but are not themselves an inference. The structure of inductive inference is determined, and the deductive inference and the inferential part of the scientific process are given. Furthermore, the article addresses (...) the reliability of the inductive process, emphasising the difficulties in obtaining accurate results. In conclusion, it is shown that Aristotelian science has a fundamentally intuition-based part and plays an important role in the scientific process. (shrink)

There is a consensus in the contemporary literature that mindfulness is a kind of attention. From here the literature divides into two opposing camps:the ‘Quietists’ and the ‘Cognitivists’. For the...

Abstract:This is a phenomenological study of mindfulness, a term commonly used to translate the Pāli term sati, and the practice that can lead to its establishment. It first attempts to account for mindfulness as a way of being-in-the-world. It then uses this description as a contrast to present an alternative and more satisfactory account. According to the alternative account, the practice of cultivating mindfulness is the practice of switching one's mode of being from being-in-the-world to 'nature-naturing'. From a different perspective, (...) this is the practice of tuning-out of our projects (the kind of possibility that is constitutive of being-in-the-world) and tuning-in to 'thingly possibilities' (the kind of possibility that is constitutive of nature-naturing). Mindfulness, the potential fruit of this practice, is the feeling of being tuned-in to naturenaturing and thingly possibilities. The study concludes with a description of how mindfulness gives rise to wisdom, the understanding of things as they are. (shrink)

A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...) phenomenology but by a common mental, usually some sort of conative, attitude toward the sensation. Here I criticize both views and offer an alternative framework that combines what is right in both while avoiding their unintuitive commitments. The result is the reductive (psychofunctionalist) adverbial sensory modification view of pleasure and displeasure. (shrink)

The modern era has witnessed an extraordinary and unprecedented growth in our empirical knowledge regarding the human body. This raises the question: what, if anything, can phenomenology teach us about the body that the empirical sciences cannot? Whereas common sense and empirical sciences begin from the body as straightforwardly and obviously given and go on from there to think about what this thing is, what it is made up of, and how it originated, phenomenology steps back from the straightforward fact (...) in order to ask: what is the structure of the body as an appearance? This chapter considers how some of the main figures in phenomenology have tried to answer this question. The body is not explicitly discussed in what might be thought of as the two foundational works of phenomenology: Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Heidegger’s Being and Time. Nevertheless, these works set the stage for the subsequent phenomenology of the body by describing the phenomena of multidimensionality and horizontality. Our first task will be to sketch out how these phenomena were described in the foundational works. This sets up our exposition of the body as a multidimensional phenomenon. We consider Husserl’s treatment of the body in Ideas II. We also examine how the Husserlian insights were taken up and developed by Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In conclusion we raise some critical questions regarding a phenomenological focus on the body and its multidimensionality. (shrink)

This work develops a phenomenological account of mindfulness, and related phenomena. It is divided into two main parts. The aim of part one is to articulate a pre-phenomenological sketch of mindfulness by drawing on passages from some of the classic works of Western literature and everyday life, through an interpretation of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and by the means of a critical analysis of the contemporary attempts to account for these phenomena. Part two adds further detail to the sketch by entering (...) a dialogue with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. A key distinctions made here is between the transcendental horizon and the open horizon. This difference allows cultivating mindfulness to be defined as the practice of tuning-out of the transcendental horizon and tuning-in to the open horizon. Mindfulness—the potential fruit of tuning-in-tuning-out—is defined as the feeling of being tuned-in to the open horizon.A key findings of this research is that tuning-in-tuning-out is a difference practice than the phenomenological epoché; whereas the latter discloses the transcendental horizon, the former discloses the open horizon—on which the transcendental horizon is dependent. These findings open up the possibility of a phenomenological description of certain phenomena that are closely related to mindfulness. Some of these phenomena are: Mindful attention, which is defined as the function of foregrounding a sub-horizon within the open horizon and the pushing of the other sub-horizons into the background. Concentration : the narrowing down of the open horizon to one of its sub-horizons. Insight : the activity of isolating a sub-horizon, discerning its thingly possibilities, zooming out, isolating a second sub-horizon and discerning its thingly possibilities, and then contrasting the two in such a way that their difference becomes vividly present. (shrink)

Many conceive information and communications technologies (ICT) as providing a free space which bolsters the freedom of individuals. This is because the technologies, and the ways we use them, are thought to be grounded in consent given by individuals. However, it will be argued that individuals, by their own self-regulated consent-based actions when using ICT, are actually alleviating their own individual freedoms. This novel phenomenon, which Deleuze and Guattari have drawn our attention to, is a consequence of the de-territorialization and (...) re-territorialization of desires, shaped by power processes, and practiced within Control Societies. This process is disguised as ‘choices’ made by free and self-aware individuals who give their ‘consent’. (shrink)

This book represents the author's view of humanity.

I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some other (...) similar experiences like itches, tickles, orgasms, hedonic valence, etc., are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence they constitute empirical counterexamples to representationalism. Given that representationalism is a general metaphysical doctrine about all experiential phenomenology for good reasons, I conclude that representationalism about phenomenal consciousness is false. Then, I outline a general framework about how the introspection of phenomenal qualities in perceptual experience works in light of the transparency datum, but consistent with the rejection of strong transparency. The result is a form of qualia realism that is naturalist and intentionalist, and has close affinities to the adverbialist views developed in the latter part of the last century. I then apply this framework to pain experiences and their bodily locations. (shrink)

According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the (...) relationship between perceptual views and two (weak and strong) forms of representationalism about experience. I will argue that pains pose very serious problems for strong representationalism as well. (shrink)

Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...) tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them. (shrink)

Sweeping changes in technology followed by political, social and economic transformation are modifying the expectations from education. There is urgent need for reforms in the aim, content and method of education systems. Evidence is gathered to justify this need and suggest a process that will lead to the desired reform. We argue that character education is a requirement in order to ensure that changes move in the direction envisaged. Empowerment of the parties involved will change the mood of silence and (...) transform the agents into active participants in change. (shrink)

In the history of Islam after the martyrdom of Hz.Uthman, serious problems emerged among the Muslims, and two great wars took place between the Companions. While these events are called strife, this time is called the time of strife. The enemies of Islam who wanted to take advantage of this confused situation of the Islamic ummah, they engaged in various activities that they thought could harm Muslims in order to grow the seeds of strife among Muslims more. Zindīḳs are the (...) leading enemies of Islam. It was necessary for Muslims to recognize the zindīḳs, who were said to have made thousands of narrations on almost every subject. Therefore, Islamic scholars wrote many works about them. In fact the authors of tabaḳāt and ridjāl many of whom were hadith scholars, also mentioned zindīḳs in their works, such that these works were extremely useful in terms of knowing zindīḳs. In this article it was determined for whom the term zindīḳ was used in the works of tabaḳāt and ridjāl and also the situation of hadith transmitters who lived in the first three centuries of the hijri who are alleged to be zindīḳ are discussed. (shrink)

From the Symbolist period to the inter-war years, and in works ever more numerous as time went by, literature and medicine, both together and separately, constructed a discourse progressively focused on the enigma of the ‘third sex’. But how perceived? As an aberration, a mere legend, a mirage, a mental defect, a mistake of nature? The ‘third sex’ came to designate the sex of the indistinct, that which has no name, drawing within its sphere the primordial Adam, the angel, the (...) ephebe, the androgyne, the hermaphrodite, the transvestite, the effeminate male, the mannish woman, the pederast, the sodomite, the tribade, the Sapphist, the transsexual, the degenerate. Around 1900, to this unsettling tribe was even added the working woman who, as a result, was thought to have ‘abandoned her true condition’, and who thus had become ‘desexualized’ or ‘asexual’. In his preface to Willy's treatise on the Third Sex (1927), describing the Paris of Sodom and Gomorrah, Louis Estève drew attention to the part played by a now totally forgotten novel of the same name, The Third Sex by Ernst Ludwig von Wolzogen (1902), in the creation, handing down and popularization of this term. But contrary to what this title might suggest, Wolzogen does not focus on homosexuals in his book, but rather on those independent women, without husbands but with jobs, whom he refers to as ‘the neuters’. Neutrality conceived of as the effacement of the masculine and the feminine, perhaps as an effect of modern life? The theme has now come full circle in the corpus of reflection on the third sex, though it seems to have been applied more specifically to emancipated women, and singularly to lesbians. (shrink)

This research paper aims to investigate. the impact of inflation. on financial sector performance in Western. Balkan. countries. The topic was chosen considering the financial sector’s fundamental role and its. impact on sustainable economic growth. This impact is measured through the effect that macroeconomic determinants of financial. performance such. as inflation, GDP. growth, general government final consumption expenditure, trade, and the lending interest rate have on credit to private sector as a share of GDP and broad definition of money as (...) a ratio of GDP, which were used to proxy financial sector development. The data are provided by the World Bank as well as the Central. Banks. of the respective countries, for the period 2002–2021. The research methodology consists of different panel regression models such as OLS, OLS robust, Fixed effects, Random effects, and Generalized method of moments (GMM). Findings indicate that domestic credit to the private sector and inflation are positively correlated, whereas broad money and inflation are negatively correlated. (shrink)

Introductory Chapter to the _Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition_ (CUP, 2009).

The official definition of ‘pain’ by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) hasn’t seen much revision since its publication in 1979. There have been various criticisms of the definition in the literature from different quarters: that the definition implies a dubious metaphysical dualism, that it requires a strong form of consciousness as well as linguistic abilities, that it excludes many vulnerable groups that are otherwise perfectly capable of experiencing pain, that it has therefore unacceptable practical as well (...) as ethical consequences, that it is unhelpful to the health-care professional as an operational definition, that it is too narrow, and many others. In my view, most of these criticisms depend on misunderstandings or on uncharitable interpretations. My aim is to go over the definition, clarify some potential ambiguities, and argue that these criticisms don’t cut much ice. At the end, I will present a few slightly reworded versions of the definition that I claim are more felicitous and capture the original intended meaning by the members of the taxonomic committee in a much better and transparent way that avoids all the major extant criticisms in the literature. (Written for interdisciplinary audiences.). (shrink)

A healthy and robust public political culture is generally regarded as being of utmost necessity for the maintenance of a stable democratic environment. Especially when a country is facing significant challenges and is in the process of devising and implementing radical reforms, the presence of satisfactory collective deliberation can ensure durability and stability. This article will focus on one type of argumentation that stands in the way of such healthy deliberation. It will explore the various forms that ad hominem arguments (...) take and consider the harmful consequences of their wide prominence in the political culture of the country. (shrink)

As a result of its failure to embrace the increasingly visible social and political diversity in the country, Kemalism, the founding ideology of modern Turkey, is currently facing its severest legitimacy crisis. Through interviews with representatives of leading voluntary Kemalist associations, this article inquires whether there are attempts to reinterpret the doctrine in order to offer an alternative, credible vision in harmony with the existing social, political and economic realities of Turkey.

This article seeks to address the increasingly pertinent concern of how to form a satisfactory liberal stance in the face of certain democratically mandated policies of non-liberal and even sometimes illiberal governments. To that end, a close analysis is provided of a particular debate that generated controversy in certain liberal circles in Turkey during the run-up to the referendum on constitutional amendments in 2010. Identifying and evaluating 5 factors which seemed to have influenced the opposing positions in the debate, the (...) article tries to demonstrate how disagreement over the ‘correct’ liberal position entails differences in overall judgement of the political situation and assessment of the circumstances. (shrink)

In this article, recent attempts by the Justice and Development Party to address the problems of Alevi citizens in Turkey are analysed. After briefly outlining the sources of Alevi revitalization in the 1990s, the article critically discusses different aspects of the Alevi Opening process. It concludes by arguing that the Alevi question reveals many aspects of the problematic nature of secularism in Turkey.

Born as φαντασία in Greek philosophy, the concept of imagination that today we understand from has a different meaning and contains different functions. This study attempts to reveal the conceptual contents and functions by examining the conceptual transformation of the concept in Ancient Greece and Aristotle’s terminology and epistemological function.